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Abstract 
A cybersecurity hazard in a Critical Infrastructure (CI) is not only about computer malfunction, but is also affecting safety and 
business continuity of CI. The study on human contribution to cyber resilience is unexplored terrain in the field of critical 
infrastructure security. So far cyber resilience has been discussed as an extension of the IT security research. Although 
cybersecurity training is a common measure to implement because of its low cost, most of the training courses aim at improving 
security awareness of employees, in order to prevent the human-error. However, this approach does not address resilience in 
handling a cyber incident. The authors conducted observations in a full-scale adversarial cyber security training for CI, where 
participants are divided into an offensive and a defensive team. The latter acts as one organization and its members play assigned 
roles such as manager, factory operator and IT administrator. From our observations, some tendencies are found in the defensive 
team’s negative social behaviors and the management issues that lead to malfunction of the team. In fact, these behaviors are 
perceived in every group of participants, regardless of the variation in their experience and in knowledge on the field. In this 
paper, the findings from the above mentioned observations are presented as possible challenges in real-world cyber incident 
management.  
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1. Introduction 
Cyber attacks on Critical Infrastructure (CI) are no longer a theoretical, but a real problem since the discovery of 
the Stuxnet worm in July 2010. Stuxnet is a threat that was primarily designed to target an Industrial Control System 
(ICS) or a set of similar systems. Industrial control systems are used in gas pipelines, power plants, chemical and 
petrochemical plants. The ultimate goal of Stuxnet is to sabotage these facilities by reprogramming programmable 
logic controllers (PLCs) to operate as the attackers intend them to, most likely out of their specified boundaries [1]. 
Well-designed ICS worms have been deployed after Stuxnet.  
Security researchers believe that the goal of the next generation of malware is not to harm people, but to quietly 
stop production at a utility, or impact the production of a rival, or short sell the shares of a company or extort money 
under the threat of a disruption [2]. Therefore, a cybersecurity hazard is not only about computer malfunction but is 
also affecting safety and business continuity of CI. 
The study on human contribution to cyber resilience is unexplored terrain in the field of critical infrastructure 
security. So far cyber resilience has been discussed as an extension of the IT security research. The current 
discussion is focusing on technical measures and policy preparation to mitigate cybersecurity risks. Although 
cybersecurity training is a common measure to implement security experts because of its low cost, most of the 
training courses aim at improving security awareness of employees, in order to mitigate human-error. This approach 
does not address resilience in handling a cyber incident. However, we believe that security training should provide 
more than just awareness. 
The need for cyber security training beyond awareness is growing in the industry, and several authorities are 
providing training for cyber incident handling. The difference between awareness and incident handling training is 
that the latter has learning objectives, while the former just tends to aim at gathering attention by showing shocking 
virtual images. We studied full-scale adversarial cybersecurity training from the perspective of human factor and 
management skills. However the training was not designed to evaluate team’s non-technical skill, it was obvious that 
the team’s capability of the non-technical skill affects the overall performance. In addition, most of the team 
experienced similar management challenges. In this paper we summarize the management challenges that are 
observed in the incident handling training as possible challenges that can emerge in real-world cyber incident 
management. 
2. Red team-Blue team exercise 
2.1. Exercise overview 
The observation was conducted several times in the Red team – Blue team exercise held by ENCS (European 
Network of Cyber Security, the Hague NL).  In this exercise a realistic scenario will be enacted with a "chemical" 
factory, which has to be operated and protected by the Blue team, while the Red team tries to hack the company’s 
network resources and aims to disturb the production process.  Participants are allocated to either red (offensive) / 
blue (defensive) team. The red team consists of 10 participants in average, while the blue team consists of 20. Each 
team sits in physically separated rooms and plays the exercise for 8 hours. Several authorities organize Blue team 
style exercise, such as by Idaho National Laboratory in United States [3], and by Queensland University of 
Technology in Australia [4]. 
Fig.1 shows the overview of offence/defence timeline and its relation to the blue team’s network. In the 
beginning, the red team starts from outside of the blue teams network, and this team exploits the blue team 
organization’s network to the depth till they gain the control of the physical plant system. Facilitator controls the 
timeline of the red team activity by giving a hint and new incentives. Meanwhile the blue team’s timeline is 
dependent to the red team. The events are driven both internally and externally, and the main challenge for the blue 
team is flexible responses to the escalating cyber attack. 
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2.2. Scenario 
The blue team in the setting of a chemical plant that was just the start of the operation, and to act as a company 
as a whole team, given the role of managers, IT engineer and operator. While producing specified products, the blue 
team has to act on security tasks, such as 1) Identify the problem on security (detection activities), 2) Change the 
system in order to improve the security, reporting (prevention activities), and 3) Reporting Incidents (and 
corresponding activities). 
On the other hand, the red team plays a role as a hacker group that was hired by a competitive organization of 
the blue team’s organization. The goals of the red team are: 1) To gather information about the production system 
and configuration of Blue team companies to be targeted, 2) Interfere the production activity, and 3) Conceal the 
attack. 
2.3. Simulation gaming  
As a game, incentives to motivate each team to act on hacking/defending activities are provided. The teams can 
gain points by reporting particular hacking/defending activities to the White team, which is played by the exercise 
facilitator. White team is in an intermediate position to control the game as facilitator so that the game will be 
almost carried as designed. The white team supervises activities of both team and provides technical and strategic 
advise.  
Fig. 1. Offence and defense activity timeline in the blue team network. 
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3. Observed characteristics of cyber incident management 
3.1. Time critical decision making with high uncertainty 
Unlike natural hazards, cyber incidents have two event timelines, in the offensive and defensive sides. The 
offence side tries to penetrate into the targeted network by exploiting system vulnerabilities. Meanwhile, the defense 
side tries to 1) prevent any incident or accident to happen, 2) detect anomaly, and 3) response to cyber incidents [5]. 
The tasks in defensive side are often illustrated as a linear three-step cycle, but they also can be parallel. Events in 
defensive side are driven by both internal and external disturbances; therefore the event timeline is hardly linear. 
  Cyber defense under an ongoing attack is always a race against time. The defense team always needs to act 
faster than the offence team on prevention and response against propagating malfunctions, while keeping high 
mindfulness in detection. Moreover, the overview of an attack is often unrevealed until a detailed digital forensics 
ends. No one knows what’s going on and everybody wants to know [6]. The uncertainty of the situation creates high 
frustration inside the organization, which affects the performance of the incident management. 
3.2. Management challenges and decision making trade-offs 
During the interplay, the following management challenges and decision making trade-offs were observed in 
every training course. The team should prepare for the future confusion in the team caused by these challenges. 
 
A) Complete assigned tasks vs. overtake new events: The execution of original task is often interrupted by other 
event. 
B) Miscommunication: Communication between task groups and managers increases the frustration, and leads 
misunderstandings. The communication path prepared for the normal operation is not enough in the crisis. Stuck 
in communication path can affect the critical decision making too. Predesigned protocol for communication is a 
key to control the situation. Also, over communication should be avoided. 
C) Prevention vs. detection vs. response task priority: Resource of the team should be allocated to prevention, 
detection and response tasks in a good balance. It is notable that the allocation should not be static. 
D) Fix big security hole vs. protect the critical production path: The defense team have a tendency to focus on quick 
fix of easily noticeable security holes. The management must conduct risk/impact analysis to determine the 
significance to production line. In addition, with limited resource in the team, sometimes there is not enough 
resource available to address on two critical security breach.   
E) Ambiguous responsibility of role (assumption): This challenge is highly related to the game’s nature. Even 
though the roles are given to each participant in the beginning of the exercise, its responsibility is up to the team. 
Ambiguity of the role definition leads to gap or overlap between task groups. This challenge is linked to 
miscommunication. 
F) Priority of entire game vs. priority of the moment: When the situation become intense, the management often 
loses their ability to foresee long-term goal.  
3.3. Transition of control mode 
In the Context Control Model (COCOM) [7], Hollnagel and Woods operationalized the concept of control. The 
orderliness of performance is characterized by the following four control modes: strategic, tactical, opportunistic and 
scrambled (Table 1). Level of control is seen as context specific and transitions between control modes are 
important aspects of the adaptions that guarantee resilience in complex environments [8]. 
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Table 1. Characteristics for the four control modes in terms of number of goals, available time, evaluation and how actions are selected [5]. 
Control mode Number of goals Subjectively available time Evaluation of outcome Selection of action 
Strategic Several Abundant Elaborate Based on models/predictions 
Tactical Several (limited) Adequate Detailed Based on plans/experience 
Opportunistic One or two competing goals Just adequate Concrete Based on habits/association 
Scrambled One – not necessarily task relevant Inadequate Rudimentary Random 
3.4. Challenges and control modes 
The four control modes can be adapted to explain the management of the defense team. The management style 
changes (sometime unintentionally) to adapt to the escalating incident situation. The more unexpected event occurs, 
the more flexible control mode the team tends to shift. Table 2 shows the relation between the four control modes 
and the above-mentioned challenges and trade-offs.  
In strategic control mode, most of the challenges do not come to surface yet. Some irregularity can be seen as a 
sign of external disturbance, and the number of unexpected events starts to grow.  When the prepared strategy is no 
longer align with the situation, the control mode shifts to tactical mode. In tactical control mode, the decision-
making authority is distributed to each division. Challenges become tangible, and uncertainty of the situation 
increases. It requires the team to adjust their system dynamically to the events. As the difficulty to handle challenges 
increase, the control mode shifts to opportunistic. The team’s goal is narrowed down, and individuals are assigned to 
task in order to achieve the goal as fastest. When frustration in the team increases and the number of event 
overflows the team’s capability of task administration, finally the mode shifts to scrambled control mode. Transition 
to this mode should be avoided, as the mode is hardly manageable. Manager should carefully supervise the level of 
management obstacles, and maintain the most suitable control mode. 
 
Table 2. The four control modes and its relation to observed challenges. 
Control modes 
(Number of unexpected events) 
Strategic 
(0-small) 
Tactical 
(Medium) 
Opportunistic 
(Large) 
Scrambled 
(Large) 
A) Complete the original tasks vs. 
overtake new events 
Several, 
controlled by 
strategy 
Frequent, controlled by 
division 
Random, based on personal 
skills 
Random  
B) Miscommunications Seldom Several, Near miss Frequent, triggers scrambled 
mode 
Confusion  
C) Prevention vs. detection vs. 
response task priority 
Several, triggers 
tactical mode 
Frequent changes, triggers 
opportunistic mode 
Random, based on personal 
skills 
Random  
D) Fix a big security hole vs. protect 
the critical production path 
Seldom Several Frequent Frequent 
E) Ambiguous responsibility of roles 
(assumption) 
Several, near miss Frequent, triggered by 
miscommunication 
Frequent, triggered by 
miscommunication 
Frequent 
F) Priority in the entire game vs. 
priority of the moment 
Follows strategy Follows divisional goal Follow incentives Random 
4. Discussion  
In observations, when a management system does not handle the situation, elevation of decision-making privilege 
has been observed together with the shift of the control mode. The core decision maker shifts from the top 
management to each division, then to individuals. From the perspective of management engineering, scramble mode 
should be avoided and being strategic mode is the most efficient and ideal. Manager in charge of incident handling 
should be able to capture the change of their control status, and adopt the best management system to each control 
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mode. For this reason, factors in organizations behavior that trigger the shift of control mode needs to be clarified. 
With more extended study, the challenges and control modes we explored in this paper can be the indicator to 
evaluate management performance in the training, and that will broaden the scope of the exercise to train cyber 
incident management methodology. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we discussed the pattern of cyber incident management with critical challenges found from the 
observation. By adapting the four control modes, dissolution of management system was explained as a result of 
increased obstacle in the situation. Incident handling can be a less complicated process by understanding the 
decision-making challenges in beforehand. The Future research will need to establish the methodology to 
dynamically maintain the four control modes. Especially, from the perspective of resilience, triggering factor to 
recover from control modes with high flexibility needs to be identified. 
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